Econ 51 | 12 | Acting on Private Information

Bayes Nash Equilibrium and Auctions

Econ 51 | 11 | The Economics of Ongoing Relationships

Sequential Games of Complete and Perfect Information

Econ 51 | 10 | Taking Turns

Sequential Games of Complete and Perfect Information

Econ 51 | 09 | Nash Equilibrium

Nash equilibrium

Econ 51 | 08 | Putting Yourself in Your Opponent's Cleats

Notation and definitions

Econ 51 | 07 | Strategic Environments

Notation and definitions

Copy of Copy of Econ 50 | Section 1

Multivariable calculus

Econ 50 | Section 2

The Mathematics of Optimization

Econ 50 | Section 1

Multivariable calculus

Econ 50 | Course Retrospective

Course Retrospective

Econ 51 | 19 | Price Discrimination

Designing mechanisms to reveal preferences

Econ 51 | 18 | More Fun with the Principal-Agent Model

How to design a mechanism to get someone to behave a certain way, or to reveal their true preferences

Econ 51 | 17 | The Principal-Agent Model

How to design a mechanism to get someone to behave a certain way, or to reveal their true preferences

Econ 50 | Lecture 23 | Public Goods and Common Resources

Public Goods and Common Resources

Mamdami, Trump, and Milton Friedman

Welfare Analysis of Equilibrium

Econ 50 | Lecture 22 | Externalities

Econ 51 | 16 | Uncertainty and Risk

Uncertainty and Risk Aversion

Econ 50 | Lecture 21 | Taxes

Bringing supply and demand together

Econ 50 | Lecture 20 | The Efficiency of Markets

Welfare Analysis of Equilibrium

Econ 51 | 15 | Signaling and Lemons

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Models