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Econ 51 | 19 | Price Discrimination
Designing mechanisms to reveal preferences
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Econ 51 | 18 | More Fun with the Principal-Agent Model
How to design a mechanism to get someone to behave a certain way, or to reveal their true preferences
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Econ 51 | 17 | The Principal-Agent Model
How to design a mechanism to get someone to behave a certain way, or to reveal their true preferences
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Mamdami, Trump, and Milton Friedman
Welfare Analysis of Equilibrium
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Econ 51 | 16 | Uncertainty and Risk
Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
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Econ 51 | 15 | Signaling and Lemons
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Models
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Econ 51 | 14 | Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Models
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Econ 51 | 13 | Static Games of Incomplete Information
Bayes Nash Equilibrium and Auctions
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Econ 51 | 12 | Repeated Games
Sequential Games of Complete and Perfect Information
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Econ 51 | 11 | Dynamic Games and Subgame Perfection
Sequential Games of Complete and Perfect Information
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Copy of Econ 51 | 10 | Oligopoly
Cournot duopoly and other applications of Nash equilibrium
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Econ 51 | 09 | Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies
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Econ 51 | 08 | Dominance, Best Response, and Rationalizability
The first steps to understanding strategic behavior: what will you NOT do? What, based on your beliefs about the other players' strategies, might you do?
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Econ 51 | 07 | Introduction to Game Theory
Notation and definitions
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Econ 50 | 06 | The Neoclassical Model
General equilibrium
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Econ 51 | 05 | Comparative Advantage
Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade
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Econ 51 | 04 | Competitive Equilibrium
Efficiency and Equity in the Edgeworth Box
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Econ 51 | 03 | Trading from an Endowment
Building the Basis of Exchange Equilibrium
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Econ 50 | Lecture 03
The Marginal Rate of Substitution and the Implicit Function Theorem
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Econ 51 | 02 | Efficiency and Equity in the Edgeworth Box
Efficiency and Equity in the Edgeworth Box